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TAFIr-HARTLEY SYMPOSIUM:
THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS
TAFT-HARTLEY: A SLAVE-LABOR LAW?
Nelson Lichtenstein*
In the immediate aftermath of the successful 1997 United Parcel Serv-
ice strike, the dusty, antique world of big time industrial relations, with
its emphasis on worker solidarity, collective bargaining, company-wide
strikes, and corporate labor strategy, once again seemed to have some
relevance to the larger political economy. Did the solidarity of the UPS
strikers mean that something fundamental had changed within the minds
of millions of working Americans? Were the unions about to launch a
new wave of organizing campaigns? Had the politics of class conflict re-
turned to the American scene?
Such questions reopened a discussion of the politics and policy incor-
porated into the original Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, enacted by Congress
precisely fifty years before the Teamsters Union demonstrated that trade
union power was not entirely a thing of the past. Indeed, if the UPS
strike marks the close of labor's era of stagnation and defeat, then it may
offer the best vantage point from which to glimpse the origins of labor's
long, half-century march toward weakness and marginality.
The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act was, in Daniel Bell's apt phrase, "essen-
tially a definition of power."' The first question to consider on its fiftieth
anniversary is the following: Did the law simply ratify an emerging indus-
trial orthodoxy, or did it inaugurate a new era of class relations that was
qualitatively different from that which had gone before? Most historians
and legal scholars have adopted the view that the Taft-Hartley Law
merely codified a preexisting set of relationships. These commentators
describe the pluralist industrial relations system that was forged after
1938, when collective bargaining became increasingly routinized and
when, from both" a political and ideological perspective, the opportunities
available to the labor movement and its liberal allies were increasingly
constrained.
* Professor, Corcoran Department of History, The University of Virginia.
1. Daniel Bell, The Taft-Hartley Fumble, FORTUNE, May 1949, at 189, 190.
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Such propositions hold considerable weight, even outside those con-
sensus-era academics and industrial relations practitioners who empha-
sized the growth and stability of the unions in the decade after the law's
passage. Writing in the late 1950s, Joseph Shister, one of the nation's
most prominent industrial relations scholars, concluded that "[t]en years
of experience under the Taft-Hartley Act have made one point crystal
clear: it is certainly not a 'Slave Labor Law' and it has certainly not de-
stroyed trade unionism and collective bargaining .... ,2 By 1958, union
membership had "risen by over three millions-which is hardly sympto-
matic of a labor movement in process of disintegration."3 His judgment
was soon endorsed by a generation of pluralists, including Derek Bok
and David Feller, who thought the Taft-Hartley reform of the Wagner
Act failed to disestablish a large and durable union presence within the
American polity.
4
Scholars influenced by the late New Left have also tended to downplay
the importance of Taft-Hartley, if only because they saw the Wagner Act
itself as inherently statist. Thus, Christopher Tomlins asserted that "It]he
Taft-Hartley Act ... proved much less of a break with the past than has
usually been assumed."5 Writing in 1985, he argued that while the Re-
publican-dominated Congress did seek "to limit the influence of en-
trenched labor organizations... the ambitions of some of its proponents
to go further than this and overthrow the model of labor relations estab-
lished in the United States after 1940 remained unfulfilled., 6 Even
George Lipsitz, one of the most imaginative of the post-modern, post-
New Left historians, thought that Senator Robert Taft's commitment to a
system of collective bargaining, enshrined in the final version of the law,
"demonstrated the essentially moderate nature of the bill, its congruence
with prior legislation, and the limited nature of the conservative cri-
tique."
7
But a number of questions remain. First, what precisely was the
"model of labor relations" which the Taft-Hartley Act sought to reform?
2. Joseph Shister, The Impact of the Taft-Hartley Act on Union Strength and Collec-
tive Bargaining, 11 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 339, 350 (1958).
3. Id.
4. See generally Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American
Labor Laws, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1394, 1394-1463 (1971); David E. Feller, A General The-
ory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CAL. L. REV. 663, 663-856 (1973).
5. CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS,
LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960, at 251 (1985).
6. Id.
7. GEORGE LIPSITZ, RAINBOW AT MIDNIGHT: LABOR AND CULTURE IN THE
1940s, at 170 (1994).
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Here we must distinguish between the legal and administrative frame-
work created by the Wagner Act and modified over time by the courts,
the War Labor Board and the National Labor Relations Board, and the
actual model of highly politicized union growth and economic bargaining
that emerged from twelve years of ideological combat, political organiza-
tion, state building, and union growth.
This article argues that the proponents of the Taft-Hartley Act sought
to achieve far more than the mere reform of the labor law; instead the
law was part of a larger contestation in which the entire structure of the
political economy and the postwar political culture was involved. Taft-
Hartley advocates saw the law as a proxy for a much larger social and
political project whose import extended well beyond the recalibration of
the "collective bargaining" mechanism. Indeed, the Taft-Hartley law
stands like a fulcrum upon which the entire New Deal order teetered.
Before 1947 it was possible to imagine a continuing expansion and vitali-
zation of the New Deal impulse. After that date, however, labor and the
left were forced into an increasingly defensive posture.
I. THE LANGUAGE OF TAFT-HARTLEY
One way to approach the meaning of Taft-Hartley is to consider the
language by which its contemporary proponents and detractors evaluated
its consequences. If the Act proved so moderate and inconsequential,
then why did such passionate rhetoric accompany the legislative battle of
1947? Why did President Truman expend significant political capital in a
vain effort to veto the law, and then make its reform, if not its outright
repeal, the single most important domestic issue in his 1948 election
campaign? Indeed, it is helpful to examine the rhetoric of an era at face
value, or at least to note that the language of politics has a meaning and
weight that merits serious evaluation. So if one takes another look at the
political language of 1946 and 1947, it is clear that the principle combat-
ants believed that important issues were at stake. The half-century old
rhetoric still blisters with a passion that cannot be ignored: slavery, servi-
tude, freedom, liberty, and redemption were words both opponents and
supporters of the Taft-Hartley Act hurled at each other.8
8. Historians of labor and social class have become particularly attuned to the rheto-
ric of politics and the discourse of debate. See generally MICHAEL KAZIN, THE POPULIST
PERSUASION: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 285-86 (1995); BRYAN D. PALMER, DESCENT
INTO DISCOURSE: THE REIFICATION OF LANGUAGE AND THE WRITING OF SOCIAL
HISTORY (1990); RETHINKING LABOR HISTORY: ESSAYS ON DISCOURSE AND CLASS
ANALYSIS (Lenard R. Berlanstein ed., 1993).
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A. The Resistance of Organized Labor
Labor's denunciation of the law as one of "slave labor" is well remem-
bered. After Congress passed the act in May 1947, but before enactment
over President Truman's veto, Congress of Industrial Organizations
(CIO) President Philip Murray glimpsed an abyss of totalitarian repres-
sion unfolding before the nation. "Where in the name of God is our
country going?" he told his colleagues on the CIO executive board. 9
"You have read these stories of what is happening in Europe. I venture
to the assertion that if that bill becomes law, in the course of time under
its operation ... the trends are and the powers have so decreed, that we
should have a type of Fascist, capitalistic control over the lives of men,
women, and children."' As a devout Roman Catholic, Philip Murray
declared the law "conceived in sin."" In addition, CIO counsel Lee
Pressman, a secular Jew with leftwing sympathies, offered his own ethical
judgment: "[W]hen you think of it merely as a combination of individual
provisions, you are losing entirely the full impact of the program, the
sinister conspiracy that has been hatched . . . .", In giant rallies of pro-
test and petition, both the AFL and the CIO unfurled huge banners de-
nouncing Taft-Hartley as a "Slave-Labor Act."'3
Labor's charge that Taft-Hartley was a "slave labor" statute raised an
immediate outcry from the law's proponents. In response, George
Meany, then Secretary-Treasurer of the American Federation of Labor
(AFL), defended the proposition that the new law was a step toward in-
voluntary servitude. In a speech delivered a few months after its passage,
Meany declared that Taft-Hartley "completely demolishes the natural,
organic development which is collective bargaining, and substitutes, in-
stead, what at best is paternalistic statism, and at worst, out and out dic-
tatorship.' 4 Meany asserted that Taft-Hartley amounted to a kind of in-
dustrial slavery, which he evaluated according to the democratic promise
of the 1914 Clayton Act. To Meany, that law had declared that "'[t]he
labor of a human being is not an article or commodity of commerce,"" 5
9. DAVID L. STEBENNE, ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, NEw DEAL LIBERAL 62 (1996).
10. Id.
11. CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS (CIO), FINAL PROCEEDINGS OF
THE NINTH CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 22 (1947).
12. Id. at 189.
13. Cf. id. at 186 (noting that Resolution Number 3 of the CIO's Ninth Constitutional
Convention denoted Taft-Hartley as a "Slave Labor Act").
14. George Meany, The Taft-Hartley Law: A Slave Labor Measure, 14 VITAL
SPEECHES OF THE DAY 119,122 (1947).
15. Id. at 120 (citing Congress's language in the Clayton Act of 1914).
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but he argued that the Taft-Hartley Act's restrictions upon trade union
use of the boycott, as well as its more general efforts to limit the spread
of unionization, made more difficult the equalization of wages and condi-
tions among competing firms within the same industry. Meany antici-
pated that labor costs would therefore be at issue, pitting worker against
worker in a downward spiral that transformed human labor into a mere
commodity and workers into chattels. Quoting the great anti-injunction
jurists, Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis, Meany argued that
any governmental restrictions upon the right to refuse work "'reminds
one of involuntary servitude.' 16
B. Employer Opposition
Organized labor was not alone in deploying a morally charged lan-
guage of servitude and liberation when reform of the labor law came to
the top of the agenda. Virtually all employers argued for reform of the
Wagner Act, not in order to rebalance the pluralistically calibrated in-
dustrial scales, but to prevent what they saw as a bureaucratic, near-
totalitarian, collectivist disaster. For example, Eugene E. Wilson, the
vice-chairman of United Aircraft Corporation, warned that unless the
power of a laborite New Deal was stanched and the Wagner Act re-
pealed, the resulting abridgement of economic freedom would inevitably
mean that "'Christian freedom will give way to atheistic slavery, coopera-
tion to compulsion, hope to fear, equality of opportunity to privilege, and
the dead hand of bureaucracy will close the throttle on progress."
17
The House Committee that reported a Taft-Hartley revision in the
spring of 1947 used similar rhetoric. The draconian reform of the labor
law was essential because the unamended Wagner Act had created a
situation where:
[T]he American working man has been deprived of his dignity
as an individual. He has been cajoled, coerced, intimidated and
on many occasions beaten up .... His whole economic life has
been subject to the complete domination and control of un-
regulated monopolists. He has on many occasions had to pay
them tribute to get a job. He has been forced into labor organi-
zations against his will .... In short, his mind, his soul, and his
16. Id. (quoting a dissent of Justices Holmes and Brandeis).
17. ELIZABETH A. FONES-WOLF, SELLING FREE ENTERPRISE: THE BUSINESS
ASSAULT ON LABOR AND LIBERALISM, 1945-60, at 22 (1994) (citing United Aircraft Cor-
poration Vice-Chairman Eugene E. Wilson).
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very life have been subject to a tyranny more despotic than one
could think possible in a free country.
Such sentiments were not confined to "brass hat" industrialists or con-
gressional reactionaries, but resonated widely among the literate public.
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that F. A. Hyack's The Road to Serf-
dom, which the University of Chicago first published as an academic
tome in 1944, was selling hundreds of thousands of copies each year by
the end of the decade.19
Why did American managers, executives, and business-oriented con-
servatives feel so oppressed by the New Deal and the Wagner Act at a
moment when in every other industrialized democracy, social and politi-
cal structures were being put in place that institutionalized a postwar set-
tlement characterized by corporatist bargaining structures, the growth of
trade unions, and an expansion of the welfare state? When the Taft-
Hartley Act was passed in June 1947 over President Harry Truman's
veto, the Labour Government in Great Britain was preparing to nation-
alize the coal and steel industries, the Scandinavians were well on their
incremental way toward further consolidation of a corporatist triparti-
tism, and the Western-zone Germans, recovering from the shock and
disorganization of total defeat, were discussing a model of industry gov-
ernance with the idea of co-determination at its ideological and industrial
center.20
In the United States many trade unionists sought to put such models
on the postwar agenda, but almost to a man-and they were all men-
American industrialists universally repudiated such visions as either Sta-
linism, servitude, or both. These businessmen saw the potential emer-
gence of a corporatist, regulatory state, backed by a powerful labor
movement, as the essence of "creeping socialism." "Americans have
failed to comprehend the magnitude of the challenge to free enterprise,"
declared Chamber of Commerce president William Jackson in an early
1947 speech in Milwaukee, "[d]espite the extent of nationalization in
18. William J. Walker, The Taft-Hartley Law: Preserves Freedom of the Worker, 14
VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 123, 123 (1947) (citing a House of Representatives Com-
mittee report on the Taft-Hartley Bill).
19. Cf ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN
RECESSION AND WAR 157-61 (1995) (discussing the significant impact of Hayek and The
Road to Serfdom).
20. See generally ANTHONY CAREW, LABOUR UNDER THE MARSHALL PLAN: THE
POLITICS OF PRODUCTIVITY AND THE MARKETING OF MANAGEMENT SCIENCE (1987);
CHARLES S. MAIER, IN SEARCH OF STABILITY: EXPLORATIONS IN HISTORICAL
POLITICAL ECONOMY 153-84 (1987); Otto Jacobi & Walter Muiller-Jentsch, West Ger-
many: Continuity and Structural Change, in EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: THE
CHALLENGE OF FLEXIBILITY 127-153 (Guido Baglioni & Colin Crouch eds., 1990).
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England and France, in Argentina and Spain and the expanding domain
of Soviet Communism, we tend to console ourselves with the thought
that it can't happen here."21 To forestall such a calamity, Jackson argued
that "this generation and those to follow must be reconditioned to the
American way." 22
Since the early years of this century, scholars and journalists have fre-
quently sought to explain why the American working class is "excep-
tional" when compared with the ostensibly more radical and class-
conscious workers of Europe and Latin America. But as the remarks of
Jackson and other business spokesmen illustrate, the most "exceptional"
element in the American system of labor-capital relations is the hostility
managers have shown toward both the regulatory state and virtually all
systems of worker representation. Thus, business support for the Na-
tional Recovery Administration's system of state-supervised cartelization
collapsed by 1935, even before the Supreme Court declared such a regu-
latory scheme unconstitutional. In fact, despite much wishful historiog-
raphy to the contrary, no well-organized "corporate liberal" body of en-
lightened businessmen supported either the Wagner Act or the Social
Security Act, the two linchpins of New Deal social reform.
23
Indeed, during the immediate postwar era, the business community
found no room for defenders of an unamended Wagner Act. Social sci-
entists have often categorized business sentiment in terms of the labor
policy pursued by each firm. As early as 1948, C. Wright Mills divided
conservative business sentiment along an axis that counterpoised an anti-
union, entrepreneurial set of "practical conservatives," and their oli-
gopolistically organized, internationally minded, "sophisticated" breth-
ren. Historians and political economists have merely refined this Mill-
sian typology. In the late 1960s, scholars identified a set of New Deal-era
"corporate liberal" businessmen who advocated unionism as a stabilizing
feature of the industrial landscape; still later, some historians emphasized
the importance of the business "realists" who, during the 1940s, accepted
a well-constrained collective bargaining regime. In addition, many
21. Threat to Capital Held U.S. Menace, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1947, at 8.
22. Id.
23. See generally COLIN GORDON, NEW DEALS: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND POLITICS
IN AMERICA, 1920-1935, at 5-34 (1994) (examining the historical and institutional back-
ground of business cooperation and conflict with the New Deal); Sanford M. Jacoby,
American Exceptionalism Revisited: The Importance of Management, in MASTERS TO
MANAGERS: HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN
EMPLOYERS 173-200 (Sanford M. Jacoby ed., 1991); David Vogel, Why Businessmen Dis-
trust Their State: The Political Consciousness of American Corporate Executives, 8 BRIT. J.
POL. SCI. 45, 45-78 (1978).
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scholars have counterpoised both the corporate liberals and the realists
against the entrepreneurial reactionaries of the South and West, who un-
categorically rejected collective bargaining. 4  This typology collapses,
however, when applied to Taft-Hartley. The voice of the corporate lib-
erals, never very loud in any event, was almost entirely absent, while the
so-called "realists" in auto, steel, and other sectors of unionized manu-
facturing are often among the most ideologically driven of all those call-
ing for a revision of the Wagner Act. They demanded not only sharp
curbs on union political activism, but also the destruction of supervisory
unionism, the elimination of the union shop, and the abolition of indus-
try-wide bargaining. Thus, even Averill Harriman, FDR's former Secre-
tary of Commerce and one of the New Deal's "tame" millionaires, de-
nounced John L. Lewis as a "labor boss"' repugnant to even the most
liberal elements of the business community. "'Labor power has grown to
the point where we find one man defying the government and recklessly
tearing down the life of this nation,"' Harriman told a 1946 National As-
sociation of Manufacturers (NAM) convention, thus affirming the con-
ventional business wisdom of the day.26
C. Sources of Business Hostility Toward Trade Unionism
Business hostility to trade unionism, and the state structures that sup-
ported it, had three historic sources. The first arose out of a profound
ideological commitment by businessmen to their historic, inherent mana-
gerial prerogatives. The second reflected the relatively decentralized,
hyper-competitive structure of many key industries, and the third arose
out of the economic and ideological transformations generated by fifteen
years of depression and war.
1. Managerial Prerogatives
The tradition of American management was one of self-confidence
and autonomy. In sharp contrast to their counterparts in Britain and
Germany, American businessmen presided over economic institutions
24. See generally HOWELL JOHN HARRIS, THE RIGHT TO MANAGE: INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS POLICIES OF AMERICAN BUSINESS IN THE 1940s, at 23-40 (1982); C. WRIGHT
MILLS, THE NEW MEN OF POWER: AMERICA'S LABOR LEADERS 223-50 (1948); Thomas
Ferguson, Industrial Conflict and the Coming of the New Deal: The Triumph of Multina-
tional Liberalism in America, in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930-
80, at 3-31 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., 1989) (surveying the policies and methods of
"realist" and "liberal" business leaders);
25. See LIPSITZ, supra note 7, at 169 (noting Harriman's attention to "walkouts by
the United Mine Workers and to speeches by their leader, John L. Lewis .....
26. Id. at 169-70.
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which were of continental scope and vast revenue long before the rise of
a powerful state or the emergence of overt class politics. In every other
capitalist nation, a strong bureaucratic state either preceded or simulta-
neously emerged with the multidivisional firm, but this pattern was re-
versed in the United States. Although the government famously aided
railroad development in the nineteenth century, such assistance and
regulation proved to be the exception rather than the rule when it came
to the great industries of the second industrial revolution: chemicals,
autos, rubber, food processing, chain stores, and movies. Thus, through-
out the era of U.S. industrialization, from the Civil War and into the
1.920s, the most critical decisions about the direction of American eco-
nomic development were in private hands. 7
This legacy made business extremely protective of their prerogatives
when confronted by the new unionism and the New Deal. Indeed,
American executives first began to use the term "free enterprise" to de-
scribe the American capitalist system in the 1930s. Such nomenclature
reflected an effort, however crudely worded, to distinguish U.S. condi-
tions from those of Europe, where the state, the gentry, and the unions
constrained entrepreneurial activity and regulated the labor market.
Moreover, such a definition of American capitalism highlighted the des-
perate sense of individual autonomy America's captains of industry
sought to rescue from both the New Deal and the new unions. To many,
this dual threat represented a "creeping socialism," because even the
limited constraints imposed by America's mixed social welfare regime
seemed ominous indeed. As Alfred Sloan of General Motors analogized
at the end of World War II: "'It took fourteen years to rid this country of
prohibition. It is going to take a good while to rid the country of the
New Deal, but sooner or later the ax falls and we get a change.'
28
2. Decentralized Industries
In addition, American business never enjoyed the successful systems of
self-regularization and cartelization, often characteristic of Europe and
the Far East. The American market was of continental magnitude and
regional variation. Despite much talk of giant trusts and industrial oli-
garchy, the U.S. system was one of "disorganizational synthesis," a re-
27. See Vogel, supra note 23, at 45-78 (identifying rationales for managerial mistrust
of bar regulation); see also Jacoby, supra note 23, at 173-200 (discussing the pervasive role
of private management in American labor development).
28. JOSHUA FREEMAN ET AL., 2 AMERICAN SOCIAL HISTORY PROJECT, WHO
BUILT AMERICA? WORKING PEOPLE AND THE NATION'S ECONOMY, POLITICS,
CULTURE AND SOCIETY 472 (1992) (quoting Alfred P. Sloan).
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vealing phrase coined by historian Colin Gordon. Ironically, the historic
conservatism of the American labor movement, which celebrated firm-
centered bargaining and eschewed independent political action, exacer-
bated this competitive disorder. Thus, American employers never
viewed a system of collective bargaining as a "lesser-evil" when com-
pared to continental socialism or British labour politics. Indeed, Ameri-
can capitalists saw even the most narrowly focused brand of unionism as
highly detrimental to their "prerogatives" because the shop-centered
thrust of such unionism insured that labor costs were unlikely to be dis-
tributed evenly among competitors. In France, Germany, and Great
Britain, industrial cartels and associations arose naturally out of the in-
sularity and class-cohesion of leading industrialists. In the United States,
however, the regional competitiveness endemic to the U.S. industrial ar-
chipelago gave ambitious entrepreneurs the opportunity to undercut
trustification and managerial cooperation. Thus, in the United States,
the very disorganization of the capitalists put a premium upon keeping
labor costs flexible, production techniques plastic, and unions weak.29
3. Fifteen Years of Depression and War
Finally, nearly a generation of depression and war had forced Ameri-
cans to confront the transition of economic power from small, local in-
terests to private and public bureaucracies of national scope. The twin
perceived evils of New Deal collectivism and union egalitarianism were
tied to White House intellectuals and planners whose interests lay with
urban ethnic minorities, organized labor, and northern blacks. Mean-
while, almost a third of a million small business firms folded during
World War II, more than ten percent of all those existing at the end of
the 1930s. Manufacturing companies with fewer than 100 workers saw
their proportion of total output drop from more than a quarter to less
than a fifth. The loss of autonomy particularly threatened small-town
bankers, merchants, manufacturers, and others in the "old" middle class.
Thus, trade union leaders were routinely denominated as "union bosses"
and "labor skates" because their power was viewed as a fundamentally
illegitimate transgression upon the decentralized producer republic
which still retained a powerful and imaginative grasp upon the minds of
so many entrepreneurs and professionals whose social roots lay with the
Protestant bourgeoisie. For these citizens, "an intrusive federal govern-
ment symbolized the daily threat to individual and traditional values."3°
29. See generally GORDON, supra note 23, at 35-86 (describing the business strategies
of the interwar period).
30. DAVID A. HOROWITZ, BEYOND LEFT & RIGHT: INSURGENCY AND THE
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II. TRADE UNION POLITICAL POWER
Given these ideological propensities and structural imperatives, we can
understand the horror with which the vast bulk of American business
confronted the New Deal and its allies within the suddenly powerful in-
dustrial unions. After 1933, the social and organizational ingredients for
a corporatist reconstruction of U.S. capitalism may have been in place.
During these years, American trade unionism reached European levels
of density. Trade union leaders were ushered into the White House for
top level conferences with their industrial counterparts, and unionism
had a real impact on the political consciousness of thirty-five percent of
the entire American electorate.
The economic power wielded by American trade unions was political
power by its very nature because the New Deal thoroughly politicized all
relations between the union movement, the business community, and the
state. The New Deal differed from previous eras of state activism not
only because of the relatively more favorable political and legislative en-
vironment it created for organized labor, but, perhaps even more impor-
tantly, because it provided a set of semipermanent political structures in
which vital economic issues were negotiated between unions and em-
ployers. Capitalism seemed both unstable and parochial, so it needed
guidance from the state, whatever the immediate interests of individual
entrepreneurs and managers."
Thus from 1933, when the new Roosevelt Administration pulled to-
gether the corporatist National Recovery Administration, until 1946,
when the consumer/populist Office of Price Administration finally col-
lapsed, all of the principal U.S. industries' key bargains were ultimately
determined by a set of state institutions that collated wages, prices, prof-
its, and union status. Beginning in 1941, the price of steel and the rate of
pay enjoyed by workers in that industry was set not at a Pittsburgh bar-
gaining table, but in the White House Oval Office. The successive ap-
pearances of these alphabet agencies-NRA, NLRB, WLB, WSB,
OPA-seemed to signal the fact that in the future, as in the past, the fate
of organized labor, and by extension, the fortunes of capital, would be
determined as much by a process of politicized bargaining in Washington
as by the give and take of contract collective bargaining."
ESTABLISHMENT 159 (1997); see also Leo P. Ribuffo, Why Is There So Much Conserva-
tism in the United States and Why Do So Few Historians Know Anything About It?, 99 AM.
HIST. REV. 438 (1994) (analyzing twentieth-century American conservatism).
31. See generally Theda Skocpol & Kenneth Finegold, State Capacity and Economic
Intervention in the Early New Deal, 97 POL. SCI. Q. 255 (1982); see also Peter Swenson,
Arranged Alliance: Business Interests in the New Deal, 25 POL. & Soc. 66 (1997).
32. See TOMLINS, supra note 5, at 197-328; Theda Skocpol, Political Response to
1998]
Catholic University Law Review
As a result, the United States seemed to advance toward the kind of
labor-backed corporatism that would later characterize social policy in
northern Europe and Scandinavia. Corporatism of this sort called for
government agencies, composed of capital, labor, and "public" represen-
tatives, to substitute their decisions for the "chaos" of the market. The
Wagner Act was specifically designed to generate a powerful trade union
movement which would use its organizational muscle to raise wages and
thereby revive the flagging economy. The premier examples of such a
corporatist formation, however, came during World War II with the War
Labor Board (WLB) and its wartime companion, the Office of Price
Administration. These were administrative regimes that regulated wage
and price relations within and between industries. Although union offi-
cials often denounced both agencies for their accommodation to politi-
cally resourceful business and producer groups, the maintenance of such
institutions were nevertheless seen by most liberal and labor spokesmen
as the foundation of a postwar "incomes" policy. That policy would con-
tinue the rationalization of the labor market begun during the war, set
profit and price guidelines, and redistribute income into worker and con-
sumer hands.33
The War Labor Board, for example, socialized much of the trade un-
ion movement's prewar agenda, making such wage bargaining elements
as seniority, grievance systems, vacation pay, night-shift supplements,
sick leave, and paid meal times standard "entitlements" for an increas-
ingly large section of the working class. Likewise, the government-
enforced World War II wage formulas, although bitterly resisted by the
more highly paid and well-organized sections of the working class, had
enough loopholes and special dispensations to enable low-paid workers
in labor-short industries to bring their wages closer to the national aver-
age. The net result was a redistributive, laborite social policy. Black
wages rose twice as rapidly as white wages under this regime, and weekly
earnings in cotton textiles and in retail trade increased about fifty per-
cent faster than in high-wage industries like steel and automobiles. By
the onset of postwar reconversion, WLB wage policy was explicitly egali-
Capitalist Crisis: Neo-Marxist Theories of the State and the Case of the New Deal, 10 POL.
& Soc. 155-201 (1980) (providing contrasting discussions of the way state functions ac-
commodated and influenced the new labor movement).
33. See generally LEO PANITCH, WORKING-CLASS POLITICS IN CRISIS: ESSAYS ON
LABOUR AND THE STATE 132-86 (1986); THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORPORATISM
(Wyn Grant ed., 1985); Ronald W. Schatz, From Commons to Dunlop: Rethinking the
Field and Theory of Industrial Relations, in INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: THE
AMBIGUOUS PROMISE 87 (Nelson Lichtenstein & Howell John Harris eds., 1993); Phi-
lippe C. Schmitter, Still the Century of Corporatism?, in TRENDS TOWARD CORPORATIST
INTERMEDIATION 7 (Philippe C. Schmitter & Gerhard Lehmbruch eds., 1979).
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tarian. A July 1945 WLB Memorandum stated that "'[i]t is not desirable
to increase hourly earnings in each industry in accordance with the rise of
productivity in that industry.' 34 The WLB also stated that "'[t]he proper
goal of policy is to increase hourly earning generally in proportion to the
average increase of productivity in the economy as a whole.'
35
This politicized bargaining demanded of the trade unions an organic
amalgamation of strike action, organizing activity, and political mobiliza-
tion. The new unions born in the 1930s represented a qualitative break
with both the "job conscious" unionism celebrated by Selig Perlman and
the shop syndicalism associated with the Industrial Workers of the
World. The bureaucratization and statification of the unions seemed not
only a fearful threat, eloquently addressed by radical intellectuals like
Daniel Bell and Dwight MacDonald, but, from the point of view of
American business, the growth of union power, worker activism, and
state capacity represented a viable and potent threat. Furthermore, the
fact that wartime work disputes were routinely handled by powerful
public bodies suggested to workers that resistance to arbitrary worksite
authority had attained a kind of social legitimacy. By the end of the war,
business was desperate to reprivatize the relationship between manage-
ment and labor by eviscerating the sanction that a wartime government
had conferred upon worker activism and union political ambitions."
A. Changing Political Framework
1. The Kelsey Strike
In the year following the collapse of Japan, three conflicts demon-
strated a managerial determination to transform the legal and political
framework used to battle their class adversaries. In August 1945, a two-
month strike erupted at the Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Corporation, which
supplied brake shoes and other parts to Ford and Chrysler. Now long
forgotten, this strike by 4500 Detroit workers encapsulated all that man-
agers thought had gone wrong in the New Deal system of labor relations.
34. Nelson Lichtenstein, From Corporatism to Collective Bargaining: Organized La-
bor and the Eclipse of Social Democracy in the Postwar Era, in THE RISE AND FALL OF
THE NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930-1980, at 122, 125 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., 1989)
(quoting a WLB memorandum).
35. Id.
36. See HOWARD BRICK, DANIEL BELL AND THE DECLINE OF INTELLECTUAL
RADICALISM: SOCIAL THEORY AND POLITICAL RECONCILIATION IN THE 1940s, at 102
(1986); see also Nelson Lichtenstein, America's Left-Wing Intellectuals and the Trade Un-
ion Movement, in PROCEEDINGS, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION
50TH ANNUAL MEETING (forthcoming 1998).
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By 1945, a social revolution had transformed Kelsey's shop practice and
workplace culture, as a new generation of second-generation immigrants
and African-American migrants achieved power within the factory. No
formal contract existed between the union and Kelsey management, but
these new workers defended their prerogatives in a near constant series
of battles with shop supervisors.37
During the war there were fifty-one "wildcat" walkouts, many directed
against foremen who failed to respect the authority wielded by union
stewards. "We made broad concessions for labor peace," Kelsey Presi-
dent George Kennedy told the House committee drafting the Taft-
Hartley Act, "but we did not get peace."3"
Although the United Auto Workers (UAW) opposed such unsanc-
tioned walkouts, the union's overarching ideology nevertheless legiti-
mated such militancy. "Before organization came into the plant, fore-
men were little tin gods in their own departments," declared a 1941
UAW steward's handbook.39 It stated that "[w]ith the coming of the un-
ion, the foreman finds the whole world turned upside down. His small-
time dictatorship has been overthrown, and he must be adjusted to a
democratic system of shop government."40  Uncooperative foremen
where ridiculed, shunned, and sometimes forced out of the factory, and
Kelsey foremen were incapable of carrying out the disciplinary tasks
mandated by top management. In response, an overwhelming majority
of foremen joined an independent supervisory union, the Foreman's As-
sociation of America, whose membership spread like wildfire throughout
heavy industry at the end of World War 11.41
The Kelsey strike sought the reinstatement of key shop leaders fired
by Kennedy, whose desperate attempt to restore a measure of shop dis-
cipline had kept tension high in the Kelsey factory for nearly six months.
Lasting for forty-five days, the Kelsey strikers defied the War Labor
37. See NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, LABOR'S WAR AT HOME: THE CIO IN WORLD
WAR II 223-24 (1982); ROSA LEE SWAFFORD, WARTIME RECORD OF STRIKES AND
LOCK-OUTS, 1940-1945, at 20-21 (1946).
38. Amendments to the NLRA: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Educ. and La-
bor, 80th Cong. 1069 (1947) (testimony of George Kennedy, President, Kelsey-Hayes
Wheel Co.) [hereinafter Hearings].
39. How to Win for the Union: A Discussion for UA W Stewards and Committeemen,
(UAW Education Dep't, Detroit, Mich. 1941), reprinted in MAJOR PROBLEMS IN THE
HISTORY OF AMERICAN WORKERS 369, 370 (Eileen Boris & Nelson Lichtenstein eds.,
1991).
40. Id.
41. See LIPSITZ, supra note 7, at 100-02; Nelson Lichtenstein, "The Man in the Mid-
dle": A Social History of Automobile Industry Foremen, in ON THE LINE: ESSAYS IN THE
HISTORY OF AUTO WORK 153-89 (Nelson Lichtenstein & Stephen Meyer eds., 1989).
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Board, top UAW officers, company management, the governor of
Michigan, and the Detroit police. Halting vital auto parts production,
the strike nearly closed Ford's giant River Rouge complex and laid off
almost 100,000 workers. The amazing solidarity exhibited by the Kelsey
strikers foreshadowed the giant industry-wide wage strikes that would
soon put millions of workers on the picket line, and shut down entire
cities in a wave of general strikes in 1946 and 1947. The Kelsey strike
was front page news for more than a month, and an account of the strike
occupied seventy-five pages in the House hearings held in early 1947.
Kennedy told the House Committee that "the outstanding weakness in
the labor field today is the lack of union responsibility and the complete
lack of any laws compelling or even encouraging responsibility. 42 He
added that "[s]evere penalties, such as loss of bargaining rights by the
union, loss of job [sic] by the men, and fines should be imposed for illegal
strikes ....
2. The General Motors Strike
Working-class insurgency from below was soon matched by labor's
strategic offensive from above. During the fall and winter of 1945-46, the
UAW struck General Motors for 113 days. Led by Walter Reuther, the
union sought a thirty percent increase in wages without a rise in the cost
of cars. GM denounced the demand as un-American and socialist, but in
reality Reuther was merely seeking to put some backbone into the
Truman Administration's effort to sustain price controls and working
class living standards during the crucial demobilization era. Given the
enormous rise in productivity during the war, most American corpora-
tions, and General Motors in particular, had the "ability to pay" in-
creased wages to sustain the working class "purchasing power" necessary
to ward off a postwar Depression. As Reuther put it, "[t]he fight of the
General Motors workers is a fight to save truly-free enterprise from
death at the hands of its self-appointed champions." 4
General Motors' response was predictable, but also indicative of the
stakes, as seen from the highest levels of corporate power:
America is at the crossroads! It must preserve the freedom of
each unit of American business to determine its own destiny...
.The UAW-CIO is reaching for power .... It leads surely to-
ward the day when union bosses.., will seek to tell us what we
42. Hearings, supra note 38, at 1071.
43. Id.
44. NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, THE MOST DANGEROUS MAN IN DETROIT: WALTER
REUTHER AND THE FATE OF AMERICAN LABOR 220 (1995) (discussing this strike).
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can make, when we can make it, where we can make it, and how
much we can charge .... 45
George Romney of the Automobile Manufacturers Association exag-
gerated only slightly when he personalized the darkest fears of American
capital: "Walter Reuther is the most dangerous man in Detroit because
no one is more skillful in bringing about the revolution without seeming
to disturb the existing forms of society."
46
3. The Office of Price Administration
This kind of mobilization from below, legitimated by governmental
policy from above, reached its most frightening dialectic in the power
briefly wielded by the Office of Price Administration (OPA). The OPA
was another mobilizing bureaucracy of the New Deal that helped build a
powerful administrative state. Like the NLRB and the Fair Employment
Practices Commission, OPA's effectiveness depended upon the organ-
ized activism of huge numbers of previously voiceless individuals. Both
labor and the Truman Administration believed the continuance of OPA
price regulations essential to the success of an orderly and progressive
reconversion of the economy. In 1945, OPA employed nearly 75,000 and
enlisted the voluntary participation of another 300,000, mainly urban
housewives, who checked the prices and quality of consumer goods
regulated by the government. OPA chief Chester Bowles, a spirited New
Deal liberal, called the volunteer price checkers "as American as base-
ball."47 Many merchants denounced them as a "kitchen gestapo," but the
polls found that more than eighty percent of all citizens backed OPA
48price-control regulations. In response, the National Association of
Manufacturers (NAM) poured as much money into anti-OPA propa-
ganda as it would later spend on agitation for Taft-Hartley. NAM
viewed OPA as "regimented chaos,, 49 an oxymoronic phrase which nev-
ertheless captured business fear of a powerful state whose regulatory
purposes were implemented by an activist, organized citizenry."'
The Taft-Hartley Act was enacted twice. In 1945 and 1946, labor's po-
litical and ideological defeat set the stage for the legislative passage of
45. Id. at 230.
46. Id.
47. Meg Jacobs, "How About Some Meat?": The Office of Price Administration, Con-
sumption Politics, and State Building from the Bottom Up, 1941-1946, 84 J. AM. HIST. 910,
925 (1997).
48. See id.
49. See id. at 935 (displaying a National Association of Manufacturers newspaper ad-
vertisement entitled "Would You Like Some Butter or a Roast of Beef").
50. Cf. id. at 935-41.
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Taft-Hartley twelve months later. By October 1945, the Kelsey-Hayes
strikers were isolated and their strike leaders were permanently fired.
The kind of "rank and file" militancy exemplified in their struggle never
won a legitimizing public voice in the Taft-Hartley Act debates, not even
from the most left-wing of top union leaders. In addition, the failure in
1946 of the Reutherite wage-price program at General Motors, combined
with the collapse of OPA later that summer, represented a defeat for the
kind of politicalized economic bargaining that American businessmen
found so anathema. When an inflationary spiral during the summer and
fall of 1946 seemed to discredit both union power and the Rooseveltian
state, ten million working class voters remained at home. The result was
a Republican sweep in the fall and the election of the eightieth Congress
that put the containment of union power and the reprivatization of col-
lective bargaining at the top of its agenda.5'
B. Taft-Hartley is Managerial Agenda
The devil is always in the details, which is why the conservative effort
to transform the entire political economy depended upon seemingly in-
significant technicalities in the labor legislation that would sweep
through Congress in the spring of 1947. To understand the structural
importance of the Taft-Hartley Act, three elements of the managerial
agenda require some elaboration: (1) the destruction of unionism among
foremen and first line supervisors; (2) the elimination of Communist in-
fluence from the trade unions; and (3) the effort, unsuccessful at the
time, to curb industry-wide bargaining.
1. Supervisory Unionization
Section 2(3) of the Taft-Hartley Act, which excluded foremen and
other supervisors from coverage under the NLRA, proved the single
most powerful weapon crafted by labor's opponents under the new law.
The organization of supervisory employees, usually into unions of their
own, represented one of the most important socio-political phenomena
of the late New Deal era. With the rise of mass production and bureau-
cratic rationality, first-line supervisors had become both a linchpin in the
production process and an anomalous "man in the middle," buffeted
from below and above by militant workers and the managerial quest for
efficiency and control. The Foreman's Association of America claimed
51. JAMES BOYLAN, THE NEW DEAL COALITION AND THE ELECTION OF 1946, at
151-67 (1981). See generally JOEL SEIDMAN, AMERICAN LABOR FROM DEFENSE TO
RECONVERSION 233-44 (1953); Jacobs, supra note 47, at 940-41.
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neutrality in the "ceaseless struggle between ownership and wage labor,"
but it functioned like a trade union, alligning itself with the CIG. 2 Theo-
dore Iserman, the Chrysler attorney who played a key role in drafting the
House version of the Taft-Hartley Act, recognized that "'[s]olidarity of
labor' is not an empty phrase, but a strong and active force . . . ."" He
estimated that supervisory unionism would win recognition at twenty to
fifty percent of all workplaces. 4
Shifting its stance to accord with industrial reality, both the WLB and
the NLRB sustained the unionization of foremen. In its March 1945
Packard decision, the NLRB used the same criterion advanced by the
Foreman's Association in distinguishing first-line supervisors from top
management: they were employees under the Wagner Act because they
did not set policy. In 1946, the Board went further and ruled in a case in-
volving coal mine supervisors at the Jones & Laughlin Steel Company:
foremen could not be barred from membership in a rank and file union
because of provisions regarding employees' freedom of choice under the
Wagner Act. By 1946, the FAA held a collective bargaining contract at
the Ford Motor Company and had won NLRB elections at scores of
Midwestern manufacturing facilities.
America's top managers viewed foreman unionization as industrial an-
archy, which was the language they used to describe union control of the
shop floor work environment. "'We must rely upon the foremen to try
and keep down those emotional surges of the men in the plants and urge
them to rely on the grievance procedure,"' argued a Ford Motor Com-
pany spokesman, "'[i]f we do not have the foreman to do that, who is
going to do it?"' Seniority rights, grievance procedures, and union rep-
resentation by foremen were deemed subversive by management be-
cause if supervisors themselves felt less threatened by orders from above,
then the immense social and psychological pressures generated from be-
low would surely turn them into unreliable agents of corporate power.
Managerial recourse to military analogies ensued: "'[plicture if you can
the confusion of an army in the field,"' asserted a Detroit machine shop
executive, "'if the non-commissioned officers were forced to listen to the
commands of the men in their ranks as well as those of their superior of-
ficers."'56 Argued Kelsey's George Kennedy, "[i]f foremen are taken
52.. Cf. Hearings, supra note 38, at 868 (testimony of FAA President Robert Keys).
53. Id. at 2711 (testimony of Theodore Iserman).
54. See id. at 2710.
55. Lichtenstein, supra note 41, at 177 (quoting Ford Motor Company counsel Wil-
liam T. Gossett); see also Hearings, supra note 38, at 1074.
.56. Lichtenstein, supra note 41, at 177-78; see also Hearings, supra note 38, at 1074.
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away from management, how can management effectively operate its
plants?""
Foreman organization, however, did not just threaten to weaken
managerial authority at the point of production. Rather, it eroded the
vitality of corporate ideology in society at large, by shattering the unitary
facade of management and opening the door to a much larger definition
of what constituted a self-conscious working-class identity. "The Fore-
man Abdicates" ran a Fortune headline in 1945, but the larger issue was
whether or not the lower middle class-clerical workers, salesmen, store
managers, bank tellers, engineers, and draftsmen-would also abandon
their identification with the corporate order. "'Where will unionization
end?"' asked GM's Wilson, "'[w]ith the vice presidents?"' " The legisla-
tive history of the Taft-Hartley Act put it this way: "Supervisors are
management people .... It seems wrong, and it is wrong, to subject peo-
ple of this kind, who have demonstrated their initiative, their ambition,
and their ability to get ahead, to the levelling processes of seniority, uni-
formity and standardization . . . . 9 The deunionization of the foremen,
and their forced-draft conscription back into the managerial realm, was
therefore essential to the reghettoization of the union movement and the
victory of management all along the white-collar frontier.
The magnitude of labor's defeat on the issue of supervisory unionism
has become clearer with each passing year. Through the 1940s and
1950s, top executives feared their own supervisors as the potent allies of
a well-organized working-class insurgency. In response, managers de-
manded supervisory "loyalty," but few executives actually defined such a
requirement in an aggressively anti-union fashion. In the 1970s and
1980s, however, the very conditions that once made first line supervisors
vulnerable to rank and file influence-their daily contact, rapport, and
sociological affinity-gave managers and anti-union consultants the in-
centive to conscript this strata as the shock troops who are thrown into
the anti-union battle at the first hint of an organizing campaign. In the
1950s, the NLRB often protected supervisors who refused to report the
union activities of their subordinates to top management, but in later
years the judicial tilt toward management stripped supervisors of this
protection. When labor's organizing activities threaten a union-free
company today, standard operating procedure requires management to
57. Hearings, supra note 38, at 1074; see also Lichtenstein, supra note 41, at 178.
58. The Foreman Abdicates, FORTUNE, Sept. 1945, at 150.
59. Virginia A. Seitz, Legal, Legislative, and Managerial Responses to the Organiza-
tion of Supervisory Employees in the 1940's, 28 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 199, 240 (1984)
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 245).
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call a meeting of all first-line supervisors in order to threaten or fire
those who resist implementation of the anti-union strategy. As one labor
organizer noted, once managers "'make it a point to frighten the supervi-
sors,"' the supervisors "'turn around and frighten the employees.
' 6
0
2. The Elimination of Communist Influence from the Trade Unions
If the elimination of supervisory unionism is today a largely forgotten
episode in the politics of Taft-Hartley, then the anti-Communist thrust of
the law-including section 9(h), which required all trade union officials
to sign an affidavit asserting they were not Communists, by organiza-
tional affiliation or belief-looms large in our historical imagination.
This clause generated enormous bitterness among trade unionists of all
political colorations, touched off a civil war within the CIO, and gener-
ated more than a decade of litigation that marginalized scores of union
leaders, even as leftists and civil libertarians waged a long, and ultimately
successful, legal battle to overturn the prohibition.
The clause was obnoxious to contemporary unionists, because it in-
scribed in the law a class distinction and stigmatic mark that even the
most anti-Communist trade union officials found repugnant. The law
only required trade unionists to sign such an affidavit, not employers.
Thus, denunciations of the clause came not only from the left but from
such veteran anti-Communists as John L. Lewis, who hated the CIO
leftists, and Max Zaritsky of the hatters union, who had purged his or-
ganization of Communist influence twenty years earlier. Lewis pulled
600,000 miners out of the AFL rather than sign the affidavit, while Zarit-
sky, who filed in September 1947, put his signature to the affidavit "with
a feeling of revulsion for the trend of thought that has forced this foreign
procedure on American labor.,
61
Given such opposition and the subsequent damage the, anti-
Communist clause inflicted upon the unions, one might have expected
much advocacy from the ranks of employers and congressional conserva-
tives for the insertion of this clause into the final bill that became the
Taft-Hartley Act. But the issue figured hardly at all, in either the rheto-
ric of those businessmen who championed Taft-Hartley or in the testi-
mony offered at the exhaustive congressional hearings on the bill in Feb-
60. Charles T. Joyce, Union Busters and Front-Line Supervisors: Restricting and
Regulating the Use of Supervisory Employees by Management Consultants During Union
Representation Election Campaigns, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 453, 464 (1987) (quoting the con-
gressional "Pressures Hearings").
61. Louis Stark, CIO to Follow AFL on Anti-Red Order, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1947,
at 20.
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ruary and March 1947. Such silence speaks volumes for these were the
very months in which the President of the United States established a
federal loyalty review board and enunciated the Truman Doctrine, which
represented the government's declaration of an ideological Cold War
against the Soviets.
Two reasons account for the relative apathy surrounding passage of
Taft-Hartley's anti-Communist clause. First, the enormous legal and
ideological warfare touched off by the clause was a function, not so much
of the Right persecuting the Left-which was true enough-but of a civil
war within the ranks of labor and its liberal allies that long antedated
Taft-Hartley. The UAW, the ILGWU, the UMW, and several other im-
portant unions had already put anti-Communist provisions in their con-
stitutions. Section 9(h) added a new front in this battle but was not es-
sential to the prosecution of this particular civil war. More importantly,
business leaders understood that when it came to bargaining issues or
shop floor militancy, the distinction between Communists and regulation
trade unionists was rather negligible. "Nothing is more dangerous than
to assume that those who today attack 'Communists' within their union,
and who are in consequence unthinkingly labeled 'right-wingers,' are
ipso facto believers in private enterprise or in our form of government,"
warned Stuart Ball, counsel for Montgomery Ward, in late 1946.62 He as-
serted further that "it is not necessary to pin the label of 'Marxist' upon a
labor leader to prove that what he believes is incompatible with our basic
political and economic beliefs."63
Indeed, even the most prominent spokesmen for American business
sometimes downplayed the Communist role in U.S. labor strife in order
to strike a blow at this more important target. Thus, in January 1947,
when U.S. Chamber of Commerce president William Jackson spoke in
Milwaukee, the bitter, Communist-led Allis-Chalmers strike in that city
was nearly a year old. Jackson, however, chose not to attack the Com-
munists. Instead, he attacked a pair of anti-Communists, "the Philip
Murrays and the Reuthers," whom he characterized as "extreme ele-
ments" who are "today exploiting their authority and monopoly position
as recklessly as industrial barons did in the earlier stage of the country's
national history .... ,,64 In textiles, retail trade, shoe making, and to-
62. Stuart S. Ball, A Balance of Power: The Prerequisite to True Collective Bargain-
ing, 13 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 300, 303 (1947).
63. Id.
64. Threat to Capital Held U.S. Menace, supra note 21, at 8.
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bacco, business played the anti-Communist card to keep their workplaces
union-free. But the real issue was always unionism, not Communism.65
Even when taken at face value, section 9(h) did have a devastating im-
pact on the unions. Initially, all trade union officials refused to sign the
anti-Communist affidavits. Led by John L. Lewis of the AFL and Philip
Murray of the Steelworkers, both labor federations indicated a refusal to
sign, thereby severing relations with the NLRB and, in effect, nullifying
the Taft-Hartley Law. But the American trade union movement had
long relied upon the state to facilitate and legitimate the activism of its
rank and file. The use of the NLRB to resolve grievances against anti-
union employers and participate in bargaining unit elections was now es-
sential to the maintenance of union power."'
The stakes became clear at a crucial meeting of the UAW executive
board in September 1947. The decision to boycott the NLRB had little
impact on the well-organized core of the union, but it wreaked havoc on
the UAW's coastal frontiers, where the AFL Machinists had the re-
sources to raid UAW jurisdictions. "We cannot hold our people much
longer, 6 7 reported the president of one East Coast aircraft local, claim-
ing "[t]he people in the plant are not old militant union people.... They
are young yet, and have read the papers, and they want to know the an-
swers to certain questions that they have a right to ask."6
Walter Reuther called Taft-Hartley "a vicious piece of Fascist legisla-
tion," but he still wanted UAW officers to sign the anti-Communist affi-
davits, stating "we have no alternative as a practical matter except to
comply."6 9 The furious debate that followed turned on a fundamental as-
sessment of working-class consciousness in the postwar era. Old radicals,
many of Wobbly vintage, argued for a return to "militant action" and an
abandonment of any reliance on the state's labor relations apparatus.
But those politicized during the New Deal, like the UAW Secretary-
Treasurer Emil Mazey, made a counterclaim: "We have already organ-
ized the advanced section of the working class in America. The workers
that are still unorganized are the more backward element .... These
65. See generally FONES-WOLF, supra note 17, at 53-55; BARBARA S. GRIFFITH, THE
CRISIS OF AMERICAN LABOR: OPERATION DIXIE AND THE DEFEAT OF THE CIO 139-60
(1988); TIMOTHY J. MINCHIN, WHAT Do WE NEED A UNION FOR?: THE TWUA IN THE
SOUTH, 1945-1955, at 44-47 (1997).
66. See Ellen W. Schrecker, McCarthyism and the Labor Movement: The Role of the
State, in THE CIO's LEFT-LED UNIONS 139, 147-49 (Steve Rosswurm ed., 1992).
67. LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 44, at 266.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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workers will not, in a majority of cases, strike to win union recognition. '"7°
Reuther admitted "Taft-Hartley made it harder to organize: [i]t was writ-
ten for that purpose ... but it does not make it impossible to get people
to join a union. 71 The anti-state rhetoric of his opponents was therefore
"defeatist." Unless the unions continued to organize under Taft-Hartley,
"[they] would be incapable of winning the political support necessary to
stem the right-wing tide.,
72
The elimination of the Communists, however, made such a political
strategy far more difficult. Section 9(h) did more than attack the Com-
munists remaining in union leadership posts. More importantly, the
thrust of this clause was directed toward that depoliticization of the un-
ions demanded by even the most sophisticated elements of the business
community. During the 1940s, trade union anti-Communists correctly
attacked the Communists as "counterfeit revolutionaries, 73 because so
much of their politics-like the support they offered to the no-strike
pledge during World War II-was really a function of their ideological
allegiance to the interests of Soviet power. However, American Com-
munists were not simply Soviet pawns. The great tragedy inherent in the
legal and political assault upon the American Stalinists also flowed from
the organic leadership they gave to so much that characterized mid-
century social liberalism: opposition to the Cold War, trade union mili-
tance, the defense of civil liberties, protofeminism, and above all, the
movement for the liberation of African-Americans. This trade union left
represented an anchor for many of these movements, and the elimination
of the Communists from much of American political life fatally dimin-
ished the role that the trade unions would play in the emergence of the
Civil Rights Movement and the New Left just a decade later.74
70. - Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. SIDNEY LENS, THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION 1-12 (1952).
74. Studies that see U.S. Communism largely as the Stalinist product of Soviet for-
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CRITICAL HISTORY (1957); and HARVEY KLEHR ET AL., THE SECRET WORLD OF
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3. Industry-Wide Bargaining
The final element of the Taft-Hartley Act that requires inspection is a
section of the law that was not enacted, at least not in 1947. This was a
ban on "industry-wide bargaining," or, as its advocates stated, on "mo-
nopoly unionism., 75 Fred Hartley's House Committee actually drafted
such a provision, which would have made the centralized negotiation of
multi-plant or multi-firm collective bargaining contracts more difficult,
but in the Senate, Robert Taft knew that such a provision was a "killer
amendment," and he removed it during the House-Senate conference.76
Most historians see this conflict, and its resolution, as reflective of the
divergent interests of smaller capitalists in highly competitive sectors of
the economy versus the larger, oligopolistically structured enterprises
that were quite willing to allow trade unions to take wages out of compe-
tition. Taft's Senate victory represented the growing power of monopo-
listic firms, that sacrificed the interests of their smaller, more competitive
cousins in the interests of a larger industrial relations stability. Although
big business could pass on to consumers the burden of higher wages by
raising prices, smaller firms were heavily penalized in this process be-
cause not only did they have to pay these higher prices, but they were
also subject to worker demands for pay levels commensurate with those
won by firms whose high productivity and market power enabled them to
absorb the higher labor costs.
7
But if one listens to business rhetoric during the Taft-Hartley debate,
one finds a distinct counternarrative, and not only among the oppressed
class of entrepreneurs and family firms. American businessmen univer-
sally opposed industry-wide bargaining, because they saw it leading in-
exorably to the kind of class solidarity, politicized bargaining, and gov-
ernmental intervention from which they were trying to escape. They
were convinced that industry-wide bargaining generated a wage-price
spiral, inflation, and a public demand that the federal government estab-
lish a permanent set of wage-price-profit guidelines. Thus, Charles Wil-
son of General Motors argued, "[i]f labor monopolies are permitted on
75. See HARRY A. MILLIS & EMILY CLARK BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO
TAFT-HARTLEY: A STUDY OF NATIONAL LABOR POLICY AND LABOR RELATIONS 383-
86 (1950); JAMES T. PATrERSON, MR. REPUBLICAN: A BIOGRAPHY OF ROBERT A.
TAFT 352-66 (1972).
76. Cf. MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 75, at 383-86 (noting that the House wanted to
greatly limit industry-wide bargaining); PATTERSON, supra note 75, at 352-66.
77. See LIPSITZ, supra note 7, at 160; see also DAVID PLOTKE, BUILDING A
DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL ORDER: RESHAPING AMERICAN LIBERALISM IN THE 1930s
AND 1940s, at 232-34 (1996).
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an industry-wide basis, employer cartels to match them are thereby made
inevitable, and the product of this situation in the end will require state
control of both. This is the Nazi-Fascist-Communist pattern."78
Ira Mosher, who headed the National Association of Manufacturers,
led a business group whose membership favored the family firm and the
competitive sector enterprise. He therefore attacked the "labor monop-
oly" and favored single-plant bargaining relationships because "[h]uman
relations in industry as in the home, are intimate and personal, varying
from plant to plant and from company to company .... The unique em-
ployment conditions of a given plant should not be forced into patterns
established by a few labor leaders in meetings with a few industry repre-
sentatives."79
Mosher advocated the destruction of industry-wide bargaining, the
evisceration of union solidarity and the depolitization of unionism. He
asserted: "When the boycott is combined with the closed shop and indus-
try-wide bargaining, its monopolistic character is intensified and the dan-
ger to competitive economy is increased."' Mosher attacked industry-
wide bargaining primarily because he recognized that only when an en-
tire industry was shut down did the unions have the leverage to bring the
state in on their side. Indeed, the destruction of this politicized regime
stood at the very top of the NAM agenda, followed by a ban on secon-
dary boycotts and foreman unionism. Note, however, that the elimina-
tion of Communists from union leadership found no place on the legisla-
tive agenda of this right-wing business organization.
Without the destruction of "monopoly unionism," "[plractical operat-
ing problems are neglected and social philosophies and ideologies are
emphasized .... In short, there is a marked tendency in such circum-
stances to emphasize the 'class struggle' and to argue and fight for politi-
cal ends ... ,,81 Mosher predicted that "[g]overnment intervention can
become a habit leading to regulation of wages, hours, and other condi-
tions of employment, and also of prices. In short, when government in-
tervenes in labor relations, the economy is on the highway to nationaliza-
tion and competitive productive enterprise is on the way out.
'
78. C. E. Wilson, Problems Industry Faces: The Months Ahead, 13 VITAL SPEECHES
181, 183 (1947). The language of the Wagner Act's preamble dealing with wages and
business depressions was actually deleted from Representative Fred Hartley's draft of the
new labor law. See Daniel J. B. Mitchell, Inflation, Unemployment, and the Wagner Act: A
Critical Reappraisal, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1071 (1986).
79. Hearings, supra note 38, at 2683 (testimony of Ira Mosher).
80. Id at 2691 (testimony of Ira Mosher).
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Ira Mosher's forecast proved accurate, in spirit, if not in the details.
The industry-wide collective bargaining that characterized the steel, auto,
trucking, rubber, coal, and transport industries did sustain what some
scholars have described as a system of meso-corporatism, or pattern bar-
gaining. Businessmen grudgingly accepted such economic coordination
throughout the 1950s and 1960s, but as David Stebenne has demon-
strated in his outstanding biography of Arthur Goldberg, they gave to
the "labor-management accord" of those years a highly qualified alle-
giance. Indeed, the United Steelworkers felt compelled to strike the in-
dustry at almost every contract renewal between 1946 and 1959. In 1962,
when President Kennedy and new Secretary of Labor, Arthur Goldberg,
tried to actively politicize these industry-wide bargaining arrangements
by putting into place a set of wage-price guideposts, the steel industry
precipitated a major confrontation with the White House. President
Kennedy then forced U.S. Steel and other big firms to rescind an April
1962 round of price increases, but the political fallout was so severe that
no Democratic president ever initiated such a direct confrontation with
major industry again."
Industry-wide bargaining proved to be far from the wave of the future
imagined by either its friends or foes. The growth of competitive indus-
try in the non-union South and in the entrepreneurial West provided the
economic and political basis for a full-scale assault upon this model, and
support for the conception advanced in Fred Hartley's House committee.
The issue reemerged on the national political agenda ten years after the
passage of the law, during the deep recession of 1957-58, the first real
challenge to competitive sector firms since the Roosevelt Recession of
twenty years before. Here we find the rise of a Republican Right, whose
distinguishing characteristic was its unqualified rejection of industry-wide
wage bargaining. Conservatives launched a new assault upon the union
shop, even in Northern states like Ohio and California. They denounced
both Walter Reuther and Jimmy Hoffa as "labor bosses," and the anti-
union right found a champion in Republican senator Barry Goldwater,
who got his political start in Phoenix by successfully mobilizing his fellow
retailers on behalf of Arizona's 1948 "right-to-work" law. By the end of
the 1950s, Goldwater declared industry-wide bargaining an "evil to be
83. See generally IRVING BERNSTEIN, PROMISES KEPT: JOHN F. KENNEDY'S NEW
FRONTIER 133-37 (1991); WALTER W. HELLER, NEW DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY 42-47 (1966); DAVID L. STEBENNE, ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG: NEW DEAL
LIBERAL 279-315 (1996).
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eliminated," and Walter Reuther "a more dangerous menace than the
Sputnik or anything Soviet Russia might do to America. '' 4
III. CONCLUSION
Industry-wide bargaining finally collapsed in the early 1980s, presided
over by Goldwater's most successful ideological heir. One cannot di-
rectly link the concession bargaining of those years to passage of the
Taft-Hartley Act, but, taken as a whole, the 1947 labor statute estab-
lished the structural framework which made such a bargaining debacle
possible. As a consequence, the American republic is today in the midst
of a truly daring experiment: can an industrial democracy maintain viable
parliamentary institutions and a healthy civic life in the absence of a
minimally powerful trade union movement? Given the demise of the
idea of industrial democracy, the atrophy in our party politics, the con-
tinuation of a generation-long era of wage stagnation, and the insecurity
which stalks the American workplace, this issue remains open to debate.
If so, then labor's proposition of 1947 is still viable: Taft-Hartley was in-
deed a "slave labor law."
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